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The Dual-Faceted Federalism Framework and the 
Derivative Constitutional Status of Local Governments 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is the federal constitutional status of local governments? This 
question, though capable of succinct and simple articulation, is one that 
seemingly lacks a similarly short or simple answer. In fact, the question 
is one that has bedeviled the United States Supreme Court for many 
years, appearing most frequently—though sometimes only implicitly—in 
those cases that have grappled with recurring questions of whether 
particular constitutional restrictions place limitations on the ability of 
states to freely structure their local governments.1 This grappling has 
often led to facially inconsistent results.2 
One important commentator, Professor Briffault, has highlighted 
these apparent facial inconsistencies by identifying three facially distinct 
conceptualizations of local governments appearing in Supreme Court 
 
 1. The Supreme Court has also examined the federal constitutional status of local 
governments in the related context of determining whether certain benefits to which states are 
entitled under the federal constitution (e.g., sovereign immunity protection) are applicable to local 
governments. These cases are not explored in depth in this Comment, but current sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence is arguably consistent with the descriptive framework proposed by this 
Comment. However, a normative analysis of whether sovereign immunity should appropriately 
extend to municipalities is outside the scope of this Comment. For an article comprehensively 
treating this topic, see generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions be Accorded 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577 (1994). 
 2. See discussion infra Part II. There are two principal types of cases in which the Court has 
repeatedly been asked to grapple with this issue: first, cases in which local governments assert that 
they are entitled to constitutional protections from state attempts to interfere with their internal 
management, see, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923), and second, cases in 
which it is alleged that the state’s choice to structure its local governmental entities in a certain 
manner has led to the deprivation of personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution, see, e.g., 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). It could be asserted that there is really no distinction at 
all between these two types of cases because both categories of cases involve allegations that states 
are restricted by personal rights in their ability to freely structure municipalities. That is, even under 
the first principal category of cases, it could be asserted that alleged restrictions stem from the fact 
that stakeholders in such governments allegedly obtain vested rights in the existence and functioning 
of the established local government that might be infringed by later state action interfering with that 
local government. Nevertheless, given that the Court has generally been less solicitous of assertions 
that local governments are entitled to protections from state attempts to interfere with their operation 
and functioning, it probably makes more sense to maintain the distinction between the two types of 
cases. 
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opinions that have examined the federal constitutional status of such 
entities.3 First, some of these cases portray local governments as mere 
instrumentalities of the state, with no independent status in the federal 
constitutional hierarchy.4 Second, other cases conceptualize local 
governments as independent polities, entitled to some independent 
recognition in the constitutional hierarchy.5 Finally, other cases seem to 
view certain local governments as quasi-proprietary firms, much akin to 
private business corporations.6 
Briffault’s observation of this inconsistency raises several 
fundamental questions. First, is there a rationalizing principle underlying 
these decisions at all, or are these inconsistencies simply a result of the 
Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach?7 Second, if there is a rationalizing 
principle, what is the principle and how does it functionally operate? 
Finally, if there is a rationalizing principle, what does this rationalizing 
principle suggest about the federal constitutional status of local 
governments? I attempt to answer the first two questions, with the 
primary aim of being better able to answer the third. 
In this Comment, I explain that there is an implicit rationalizing 
principle underlying relevant Supreme Court precedent: a presumption of 
federalism.8 I further explain that each of Briffault’s three 
 
 3. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 68–69 (7th ed. 2009). 
 4. See id. at 70–98. 
 5. See id. at 98–146. 
 6. See id. at 147–73. 
 7. Briffault himself argues that the Court has, in an attempt to protect the “values of 
federalism,” moved toward a conceptualization that views local governments more like independent 
polities entitled to some recognition in the constitutional hierarchy. See Richard Briffault, “What 
About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1303, 1311–17 (1994). 
 8. Given that the term “federalism” is concededly susceptible to more than one possible 
construction, it is helpful to explain what I mean when I refer to the “presumption of federalism” 
within this Comment. Justice O’Connor, writing for the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
explained that the Constitution established a “federalist structure of joint sovereigns” designed to, 
through “a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal government,” “reduce the 
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). In this system, “the States 
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)). 
Federalism deals with the “proper balance [of power] between the States and the Federal 
Government.” Id. at 459. Consistent with these statements, I use the term “presumption of 
federalism” in this Comment to refer to the notion that the states should be free to make decisions 
relating to the “structure of [their local] government[s],” id. at 460, without meddling from external 
sources—including Congress and the federal courts—because it is only through providing states 
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“conceptualizations” of municipalities is really nothing more than a 
consistent manifestation of the interaction between supremacy and the 
presumption of federalism in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
While it is likely obvious—and certainly not novel—to suggest that 
federalism plays a role in the Court’s local government jurisprudence, 
this Comment contributes to the relevant scholarship by proposing a new 
framework that better explains federalism’s actual role. The Comment 
notes that federalism plays dual roles, both (1) limiting the likelihood 
that the Court will find that a state’s choices about structuring its local 
governments are constitutionally impermissible9 and (2) leading the 
Court to tailor its remedies as narrowly as possible in order to produce 
minimal disruption where it finds that a state has run afoul of particular 
constitutional prohibitions in structuring its local governments. Thus, 
federalism limits the extent to which the supremacy of federal law 
interferes with a state’s choices about how to structure its local 
governments. 
 
with this freedom that “a State defines itself as a sovereign,” id. Thus, in using the term federalism, I 
am not referring to the assertion—advanced by certain scholars—that federalism refers to a group of 
“values” that are relatively better advanced by greater decentralization of government. See, e.g., 
Briffault, supra note 7, at 1303–05 (explaining that “[c]ontemporary legal discourse concerning 
federalism ha[d] shifted from the formal to the normative, that is, from a focus on the fifty states as 
unique entities in the American constitutional firmament to a concern with the values of federalism” 
and noting that “[i]n this way, federalism tends to become merely an emphatic way of speaking of 
decentralization—a rhetorical trope with special resonance in American history and law—without 
any particular application to the states”); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local 
Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961–62 (2007) (“The Court in its 
modern federalism jurisprudence has built a largely instrumental case for devolving and 
decentralizing governmental power. This vision of federal structure privileges state sovereignty in 
order to promote efficiency and intergovernmental competition, check governmental tyranny, draw 
on pluralism and the experimental values of decentralized governance, and reinforce community and 
democratic participation. These core instrumental concerns are served even more forcefully by 
enhancing the autonomy of local governments. Thus, the very values of federalism that the Court 
invokes to enhance state sovereignty provide a compelling case for the particular exercise of federal 
authority represented by cooperative localism . . . .”). 
 9. While this principle has generally heretofore only been implicit in those cases that have 
directly examined constitutional limitations on a state’s ability to freely structure its municipal 
governments, the Court’s reticence to place limits on a state’s ability to freely control and structure 
its municipal governments has been recognized more explicitly in the related context of determining 
the applicability of federal legislation to state and local government entities, where the Court has 
imposed the super-strong clear statement canon from Gregory v. Ashcroft. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. 
League, 541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004) (involving a determination by the Court that a federal 
enactment did not apply to local governments where applying the enactment to the Missouri 
municipality at issue in the case would have granted it a power that the state did not wish for it to 
have). 
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Finally—and most importantly—this Comment also considers the 
implications of its proposed framework. It explains that recognition of 
federalism’s dual-faceted role is valuable for four reasons. First, this 
recognition will likely allow for modestly improved predictability of the 
outcome of future cases. Second, and of primary importance for purposes 
of this Comment, this recognition suggests that scholars who have 
identified a trend toward greater Supreme Court recognition of the 
independent importance of local governments have missed the mark10: 
any status afforded to local governments in the Court’s jurisprudence is 
merely derivative of their status as creations of the sovereign states. 
Third, it indicates that because the Court has heretofore only implicitly 
suggested that it views the status of local governments as derivative, as 
opposed to being independent or nonexistent, the Court should improve 
the clarity of its relevant jurisprudence by explicitly articulating the role 
federalism plays in its local government decisions, thus clarifying the 
derivative status of local governments. Finally, although this Comment 
does not normatively critique the implications of the Court’s choice to 
conceptualize local governments as enjoying only derivative status in the 
constitutional hierarchy, this observation should facilitate future 
scholarly assessment of the normative defensibility of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
The main body of this Comment proceeds in five parts, including 
this introductory part. Part II briefly provides illustrative examples of 
each of Briffault’s three conceptualizations of local governments from 
the Supreme Court’s key, past local-government jurisprudence, 
illustrating the tensions between these conceptualizations. The point of 
this exercise is simply to illustrate the tensions that exist in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, not to exhaustively catalog the Court’s relevant 
jurisprudence. Part III then explores some of the prior scholarly work 
that has attempted to explain the Supreme Court’s facially confusing 
jurisprudence. Part IV—the principal portion of this Comment—then 
presents this Comment’s suggested dual-faceted, descriptive federalism 
framework and suggests that the framework allows for the rationalization 
of the Supreme Court’s precedents as a descriptive matter, providing 
relevant application examples. Part V concludes by very briefly setting 
forth the implications of the proposed framework, suggesting that—if 
correct—the framework presented by this Comment suggests local 
 
 10. See discussion infra Part III. 
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governments merely enjoy derivative status in the Court’s jurisprudence 
but leaving a critique of whether the Supreme Court’s failure to afford 
greater independent status to local governments is normatively defensible 
until another day. 
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE EXAMINING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF STATE SUBDIVISIONS 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s cases examining the 
constitutional status of local governments have often appeared to be 
facially inconsistent. Briffault’s widely used casebook on state and local 
government highlights this facial inconsistency by presenting examples 
of three, apparently distinct, conceptualizations for local governments. 
Below, this Part of the Comment provides case examples fitting within 
each of Briffault’s three conceptualizations in order to showcase the 
apparent inconsistency between these cases, thus illustrating the need for 
the descriptive framework proposed in Part IV. 
A. Local Governments as Mere Instrumentalities of the State 
The first group of cases—those that conceptualize local governments 
as mere instrumentalities of the states—trace their lineage to principles 
enunciated in the seminal case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.11 
There, the Court examined whether the New Hampshire legislature’s 
attempts to change the composition of the Dartmouth College Board of 
Trustees were permissible. 
The Court ultimately concluded that Dartmouth College was a 
private entity, not a subdivision of the state; consequently, the Court 
further concluded that New Hampshire’s attempts to control the Board of 
Trustees violated the Contracts Clause. But in reaching this 
determination, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court also 
provided instructive commentary on the result that would have obtained 
if the Court had instead concluded that Dartmouth College was a local 
government entity. Marshall noted that “the framers of the constitution 
did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil 
institutions, adopted for internal government.”12 He further explained: 
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a 
 
 11. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 12. Id. at 629. 
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civil institution to be employed in the administration of the 
government, or if the funds of the college be public property, or if the 
state of New-Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested in its 
transactions, the subject is one in which the legislature of the State may 
act according to its own judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its 
power imposed by the constitution of the United States.13 
This quoted language is significant because it suggests that if an 
entity is a “civil institution” or subdivision of the state, then the 
Constitution does not place any restrictions on the choices the state may 
make in structuring that entity. 
The prototypical example of these principles at work is Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburgh.14 In Hunter, residents of the city of Allegheny, 
Pennsylvania, brought suit in an attempt to stop the city of Pittsburgh 
from swallowing Allegheny in a merger between the two cities.15 A 
Pennsylvania state law permitted cities to merge with one another 
pursuant to a popular vote of all citizens in the area that would be 
affected by the proposed joining of the cities.16 A majority vote of the 
combined citizenry of Pittsburgh and Allegheny had sanctioned the 
proposed joining of the two cities.17 The citizens of Allegheny, who had 
invested substantial amounts of time and effort into the infrastructure of 
their city, believed that this joining of the two cities was unfair and 
brought suit to stop the proposed merger. The Supreme Court was 
unpersuaded by the residents’ challenge to the merger of the cities, 
noting in very strong language that localities were nothing more than 
subdivisions of the state.18 Therefore, given that Pennsylvania law had 
sanctioned this joining of the two cities, the Court was uninterested in 
examining the propriety of the state’s choice. Thus, because the city of 
Allegheny was viewed by the Court as an entity with no independent 
status in the constitutional hierarchy, Hunter provides a perfect example 
 
 13. Id. at 629–30. 
 14. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 15. Id. at 174. 
 16. Id. at 174–75. 
 17. Id. 
 18. E.g., id. at 178–79 (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may 
be entrusted to them . . . . [T]he State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to 
the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the 
United States.”). 
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of Briffault’s first conceptualization of municipalities.19 
B. Local Governments as Independent Polities 
Unlike Hunter and other analogous precedent, a number of other 
Supreme Court cases instead appear to view local governments  
 
as entities with some independent status in the federal constitutional 
hierarchy—consistent with Briffault’s second conceptualization. 
One segment of the Supreme Court’s local government jurisprudence 
that has often seemed to adopt Briffault’s second conceptualization of 
local government entities is the Court’s one-person, one-vote 
jurisprudence. By imposing one-person, one-vote requirements on local 
governments, many of these cases have implicitly rejected the notion that 
municipalities are only subdivisions of the state, created for the state’s 
convenience. If municipalities were no more than subdivisions of the 
state, then reason would suggest that the states should be afforded nearly 
absolute discretion in their decisions about establishing and ordering 
these local governments. There would be no need for judicial policing of 
state arrangements for local governments because adequate recourse for 
state choices about ordering local governments could be had through 
 
 19. This conceptualization of municipalities has also appeared in a number of other cases. 
For example, in Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923), the Court reviewed New Jersey’s 
attempt to collect a license fee for water that the City of Trenton was diverting from the Delaware 
River. New Jersey had passed a law in 1907 requiring the payment of such fees. However, the City 
of Trenton claimed that it was not required to pay the fee required by this law because it had 
acquired the right to divert water by purchasing it from a private company, and this company had 
been authorized by an 1852 act of the New Jersey legislature to take this water from the river 
perpetually and without paying a licensing fee. Thus, the argument went, given that the City of 
Trenton was the successor and assign to this contract between New Jersey and the predecessor 
private water company, New Jersey should not be permitted to charge this fee. The Court, though, in 
a unanimous opinion, rejected the City of Trenton’s argument. The Court reasoned that although the 
City was an assign of the private company, “[t]he relations existing between the State and the water 
company were not the same as those between the State and the City.” Id. at 185. Whereas the 
company, that had been “organized . . . for pecuniary profit,” had “rights and property [that] were 
privately owned and therefore safeguarded by the constitutional provisions” that were asserted by 
Trenton, “[t]he City [was] a political subdivision of the State, created as a convenient agency for the 
exercise of such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to it.” Id. at 185–86. 
Therefore, “[i]n the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding” the City, Trenton, had 
“no inherent right of self-government which [was] beyond the legislative control of the State.” Id. at 
187. Consequently, the state was free to “withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it 
[saw] fit. However great or small [a local government’s] sphere of action, it remains the creature of 
the State exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will.” Id. 
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state political processes. Nonetheless, the Court, in a number of cases, 
has chosen to impose one-person, one-vote requirements directly on 
various local governments.20 Thus, the Court has suggested that it views 
these governments as having some sort of independent status as polities 
within the constitutional hierarchy, thereby justifying interference with 
the states’ choices about structuring these local governments. 
Although many of the Court’s cases that have apparently adopted 
 
 20. For example, in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Court examined the 
county government established for a small county in West Texas and chose to impose one-person, 
one-vote requirements in county elections. The plaintiff, a resident and voter in these elections, 
asserted that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by the manner in which county 
election districts—used to elect the Commissioners Court, the governing body of the county—had 
been drawn. The Commissioners Court of Midland County was the five-member governing body for 
the county. While one of the five members was elected based on a popular vote of the entire county, 
the other members were elected from four election districts. One of these election districts had a 
population of 852, another had a population of 414, another had a population of 828, and the district 
in which the plaintiff lived had a population of 67,906. Although the Court referred to the County as 
a “subdivision” of the State, the Court nevertheless imposed one-person, one-vote on the County 
government, rejecting the argument that proper apportionment of the state legislature made 
apportionment at the local government level irrelevant. See id. at 479–80. The Court noted that the 
Commissioners Court engaged in “much policy and decisionmaking” and that it had “power to make 
a large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the county.” Id. at 
481, 483. 
Consequently, the Avery Court determined, it made sense to impose the one-person, one-vote 
requirement in this case. Nonetheless, though, the Court attempted to cautiously articulate and limit 
the overall scope of its holding. The Court noted that “[w]e hold today only that the Constitution 
permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local 
government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the 
body,” id. at 484–85, and that the Court was very aware of the “greatly varying” problems faced by 
local governments and did not want to place a “uniform straitjacket” on the ability to “devis[e] 
mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local problems,” id. 
at 485. As examples of the flexibility it had previously afforded in structuring governments, the 
Court cited to two prior decisions, Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967) (sustaining 
against one-person, one-vote challenge, “a procedure for choosing a school board that placed the 
selection with school boards of component districts even though the component boards had equal 
votes and served unequal populations”), and Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) (involving a case 
where the Court had allowed “Virginia Beach to choose its legislative body by a scheme that 
included at-large voting for candidates, some of whom had to be residents of particular districts, 
even though the residence districts varied widely in population”), where the Court had chosen not to 
impose one-person, one-vote requirements on other local government elections. But see Board of 
Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989) (The Court later chose to impose one-person, one-vote 
on a New York City body of elected officials lacking general authority to legislate. While some 
members of the governing board were elected on a city-wide basis, other members were elected from 
each borough, such that certain individuals had far greater voting power than others.). Professor 
Briffault has exhaustively catalogued the one-person, one-vote cases, as they relate to local 
governments. See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and 
Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993). 
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Briffault’s second conceptualization of local governments have been 
one-person, one-vote cases, these cases do not stand alone. The Milliken 
case,21 presented below as the primary example of Briffault’s second 
conceptualization, is not a one-person, one-vote case. I utilize Milliken 
because it serves to effectively illustrate the tension between the different 
conceptualizations. 
Milliken involved a claim that the Detroit metropolitan area school 
districts had engaged in impermissible racial discrimination.22 The 
plaintiffs sought a remedy that would span the entire metro area. 
Nevertheless, the Court, though finding a violation within the Detroit 
School District, still refused to extend the busing remedy sought beyond 
the Detroit School District, noting that there was no evidence that the 
state itself had engaged in purposeful discrimination in the drawing of 
district lines.23 Thus, even though it arguably would have been more 
effective to ignore the school district all together, creating a 
metropolitan-area-wide remedy, the Court chose not to ignore the school 
district. Thus, the Milliken Court appeared to view the school district as 
an independent polity entitled to some status and recognition within the 
constitutional hierarchy.24 
C. Local Governments as Quasi-Proprietary Firms 
A third and final group of Court cases appears to conceptualize local 
government entities as quasi-proprietary firms—Briffault’s third 
typology. 
A prototypical example is Ball v. James,25 which involved the 
Court’s examination of whether one-person, one-vote should apply to the 
 
 21. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 22. Id. at 722. 
 23. Id. at 745. Justice White’s dissent disagreed and would have imposed a metropolitan-
area-wide remedy. Id. at 762–64 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White criticized the Court strongly 
for “draw[ing] the remedial line at the Detroit school district boundary, even though the Fourteenth 
Amendment is addressed to the State and even though the State denies equal protection of the laws 
when its public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate.” Id. at 771–72. White later 
continued, “[t]he actions of the State itself directly contributed to Detroit’s segregation. Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the State is ultimately responsible for the actions of its local agencies. And, 
finally, given the structure of Michigan’s educational system, Detroit’s segregation cannot be viewed 
as the problem of an independent and separate entity. Michigan operates a single statewide system of 
education, a substantial part of which was shown to be segregated in this case.” Id. at 797. 
 24. Id. at 741–46, 752–53. 
 25. 451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
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Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (“Power 
District”). The Power District was an Arizona entity created to provide 
irrigation water to the owners of land in central Arizona, which financed 
its operations by providing utility services to hundreds of thousands of 
Phoenix-area residents. The Power District limited voting to those who 
owned land to which it supplied water, with the grant of the franchise 
being proportional to the acreage owned by individuals. The Power 
District enjoyed a variety of governmental powers, including the right 
“to condemn land, to sell tax-exempt bonds, and to levy taxes on real 
property.”26  
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately concluded that one-person, one-
vote restrictions should not apply to the entity, noting that (1) the Power 
District exercised only limited governmental authority, which did not 
include “such normal functions of government as the maintenance of 
streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare 
services”;27 (2) the water distributed by the Power District was 
“distributed according to land ownership” such that the entity was only 
of “nominal public character”;28 (3) the “provision of electricity [was] 
not a traditional element of governmental sovereignty”; and (4) the 
“relationship between [the nonvoting individuals who purchased power 
from the Power District] and the [Power] District’s power operations 
[was] essentially that between consumers and a business enterprise from 
which they buy.”29 Together, these considerations influenced the Court 
to conclude that the operations of the Power District had a 
“disproportionately greater” effect on those landowners who had been 
given the right to vote.30 Thus, because the Court believed the Power 
District was more similar to a private business entity than a 
governmental entity, the Court concluded that constitutional 
restrictions—one-person, one-vote—that it had imposed on other general 
purpose local government entities should not apply to the Power District. 
 
 26. Id. at 360. 
 27. Id. at 366. 
 28. Id. at 367–68. 
 29. Id. at 368, 370 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). 
 30. Id. at 371. 
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D. Paradigm Tension Between the Conceptualizations: Milliken and 
Hunter 
Although tension exists between all three of Briffault’s 
conceptualizations—and all three are addressed by this Comment’s 
proposed framework in Part IV—outright inconsistency between the 
conceptualizations is best revealed by comparing the first and second 
conceptualizations. Comparing Hunter and Milliken illustrates this 
inconsistency. Recall that in Hunter, the city of Allegheny was viewed as 
an entity lacking independent status in the constitutional hierarchy,31 
whereas in Milliken the Court appeared to view the school district at 
issue as an independent actor entitled to some status in the constitutional 
hierarchy.32 
These cases appear facially inconsistent in their conceptualizations 
of the constitutional status of local governments. If local governments 
are only subdivisions of the state, as they were found to be in Hunter, 
then there is no reason why the Court should have avoided imposing a 
metropolitan-area-wide remedy in Milliken; after all, school district lines 
would not matter for constitutional purposes if the only relevant 
constitutional actor was the State. Nonetheless, the Court—somewhat 
enigmatically—respected the existence of the local government in 
Milliken, while apparently discounting the importance of the local 
subdivision in Hunter. These apparent inconsistencies, however, can be 
reconciled using this Comment’s proposed, dual-faceted, presumption-
of-federalism framework. Nevertheless, before presenting this 
framework, I briefly survey some of the scholarship that has previously 
attempted to reconcile the Court’s relevant jurisprudence. 
III. SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY REGARDING THE STATUS OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
Although the primary purpose of this Comment is to present and 
defend this Comment’s proposed framework—which I do in Part IV—it 
is instructive to first survey some of the prior scholarly work that has 
attempted to provide a principled description for the apparently 
inconsistent Court precedent described above in Part II. 
Quite a few scholars have pointed out the inconsistent manner in 
 
 31. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 32. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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which the Court has often treated local governments.33 Some of these 
scholars have also attempted to explain these apparent inconsistencies. 
For example, some scholars, including Richard Briffault, have 
suggested that the apparent inconsistency among Court cases might stem 
from paradigm shifts in Court thinking about federalism over time.34 
This view suggests that the cases are inherently inconsistent with one 
another and cannot be reconciled without the aid of different 
paradigmatic lenses. 
Specifically, Briffault has argued that the Court’s jurisprudence may 
appear confused because the Court has tried to promote the “values 
associated with federalism.”35 He has argued that this focus has led to 
excessive promotion of local government action and interest, further 
arguing that “[t]he [proper] role of the courts is to protect the formal 
features of the federal structure . . . . The Constitution provides for and 
 
 33. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Tribe’s City: Self-Government, The 
Constitution, and a New Urban Age, 42 TULSA L. REV. 811, 815 (2007) (“[A]t various times, courts 
have seized upon radically different legal conceptions of what a city is. Because the city has been a 
legal enigma, lawyers representing it cannot restrict their field of vision to the technical doctrines 
and specific regulatory provisions that bear directly on a discrete dispute over city power. They also 
must attend to the deeper conceptual choices that such disputes inevitably pose. While courts 
sometimes conceive of cities as if they are no different from any other level of government, that is 
not always the case. Sometimes they question whether it is right to think of cities as governments at 
all. And even when they conclude cities are governments, they are often uncertain whether to 
classify them as political subdivisions of their states or as independent democratic polities in their 
own right. A lawyer for a city, then, confronts some basic questions about what a city is.”); Richard 
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1841, 1845–46 (1994) (explaining that “legal analysis oscillates between two contradictory 
conceptions of local political space.” One of these conceptions “regards local jurisdictions as 
geographically defined delegates of centralized power, administrative conveniences without 
autonomous political significance.” The other conceptualization views them as “autonomous entities 
that deserve deference because they are manifestations of an unmediated democratic sovereignty.”); 
Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism: Images Romantic 
and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 683, 688, 742 (1997) (repeatedly suggesting that community 
government has “ambiguous and weak legal standing under our federalist system”); Nicholas S. 
Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature Predation, and the Components of 
Political Identity, 50 VAND. L. REV. 445, 454 (1997) (suggesting there was tension between the 
“series of cases arising early in the twentieth century” in which “the Supreme Court held that 
municipalities and citizens thereof had no constitutional status” and some later cases “in which the 
Court extended the right to vote to municipal elections”); Brian P. Keenan, Note, Subdivisions, 
Standing and the Supremacy Clause: Can a Political Subdivision Sue its Parent State Under Federal 
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1902 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s local government jurisprudence 
is riddled with “seemingly conflicting precedents” and explaining that this has “produced confusion 
in the federal circuit courts of appeals when a political subdivision sues its parent state”). 
 34. Cf. Briffault, supra note 7, at 1311–12, 1328–35. 
 35. Id. at 1306. 
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protects the formal aspects of the states’ existence, not the values 
conventionally ascribed to federalism.”36 Briffault suggests that the 
change in the Court’s jurisprudence is a result of the “ero[sion]” of 
“some of the conceptual underpinnings that supported the traditional 
view of the states as special” by “supplant[ing] to a significant degree the 
common understanding that the United States was formed out of a 
compact of the states” with “a historical account of the Constitution as a 
compact of the people of the United States.”37 Briffault terms this 
movement toward promoting local government “localist federalism,” 
although cautioning that the Court still “continues to distinguish between 
states and localities in a number of doctrinal settings.”38 He argues that 
because “local governments have been distinguished from their states in 
a sufficient number and variety of doctrinal settings . . . it would seem 
that the normative values of local, as well as state, autonomy have been 
subsumed into the definition of federalism.”39 He explains that this 
doctrinal movement “can result in a paradox: the use of the values of 
federalism to undermine a traditional tenet of federalism—the states’ 
power to determine the structure and powers of their local 
governments.”40 Briffault argues that this emerging jurisprudence 
ignores fundamental differences between the important federal 
constitutional status of states and the nonexistent status of local 
government entities.41 
Similarly, Professor Nicholas S. Zeppos asserts that the Court’s 
jurisprudence has shifted over time, explaining that although early cases 
seemed to conceptualize municipalities as mere subdivisions of the states 
that created them, some later cases (e.g., one-person, one-vote cases) 
appear to conceptualize them as important, independent actors entitled to 
certain recognition in the constitutional hierarchy. Furthermore, despite 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1309. 
 38. Id. at 1309–11, 1334. 
 39. Id. at 1334. 
 40. Id. at 1335. 
 41. Id. at 1335–44. Interestingly enough, although Briffault argues that the Court has 
sometimes given local governments a measure of individual autonomy in an attempt to promote 
local autonomy, some scholars have argued that traditional, dual-sovereign federalism is actually the 
best model for promoting local autonomy. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for 
Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 188 (2005). Other scholars, 
though, strongly disagree. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 915–17 (1994). 
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the Court’s “states’ rights revival,” which facially suggests that “the 
Court would [not] have much interest in . . . embracing a conception of 
federalism that recognizes more local government units and the 
individual as a citizen of a municipality,” some more modern decisions 
suggest that the Court has accepted the “political significance of . . . local 
political-geographic lines.”42 
Other scholars have carried Briffault’s concept of emerging localism 
one step further, arguing that the Court has begun affirmatively granting 
local governments a “realm” in which “local governments [are protected] 
from contrary state commands.”43 These scholars have sometimes 
labeled this recent empowerment of local government “constitutional 
home rule,”44 arguing that the Court grants local governments such 
power in order to protect “substantive constitutional rights.”45 
 
 42. See Zeppos, supra note 33, at 454–55. Other scholars appear to share views similar to 
those held by Professors Briffault and Zeppos. For example, Mark C. Gordon observed, “Court 
decisions have recognized the key role of localities without explicitly saying so. This is particularly 
true when one considers the federalist values of local decisionmaking, citizen participation, and 
responsiveness to diverse community needs, all of which occur far better on the municipal than on 
the state level.” Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New 
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 218 (1996). 
Professor Gordon, however, unlike Professor Briffault, believes that the Court’s increased 
recognition of local government is normatively a positive thing and that the Court should be more 
explicit in recognizing the important role of local governments. See id. at 218–19. Two other 
scholars, Joseph P. Viteritti and Gerald J. Russello, also have argued that somewhat-analogous 
values have become the motivating factor in the Court’s jurisprudence. They argue that the 
“Court . . . connects the geographical boundaries of a locality with the power to create and support 
the values held by those within it. Communities have the ability to preserve their own sphere of 
values that represent the manner in which they choose to live.” Viteritti & Russello, supra note 33, at 
714. Thus, for Viteritti and Russello, the Court’s changing recognition of community values 
provides the rational principle that undergirds the Court’s relevant decisions, decisions which have 
“imposed significant legal restraints on local governments” but have also led “the Supreme Court 
[to] recognize[] that localities represent the values and interests of their constituents,” thereby 
leading the Court to “provide[] some measure of autonomy for them to reflect their priorities in 
law.” Id. at 710. Unlike Gordon, however, Viteritti and Russello do not view the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the importance of communities as a positive development, noting that “[t]o the extent 
and on the occasions that communities have been granted discretion to enact public policy, these 
collective enterprises have not on the whole exhibited an extraordinary level of civic virtue and 
public spirit, and at times have necessitated corrective intervention from federal and state 
authorities.” Id. at 742. 
 43. See Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 147, 152, 174 (2005). 
 44. Id. at 168. 
 45. See id. at 148, 178–80; see also David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of 
Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 586–94 (1998–1999); Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer 
v. Evans as the Transformation of Local Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257 (1999). 
4.CANNON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
1585 A Federalism Framework and Local Governments 
 1599 
In Part IV, I argue that these “emerging localism” scholars are 
incorrect in suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recognition of local 
governments means that the Court now views these governments as 
having independent importance in the constitutional hierarchy.46 I 
instead suggest that the Court’s jurisprudence can be explained by 
recognizing that cities have only derivative significance in the 
constitutional hierarchy, which is different than suggesting that they have 
no importance at all but is also different than asserting that they have 
independent significance.47 And this observation is important. Making it 
 
 46. As noted in Part IV, I disagree with these scholars’ assertion that there has been a shift in 
the Court’s jurisprudence over time. Nevertheless, to the extent that I am incorrect in asserting that 
there has not been a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, my thesis and proposed framework is still 
relevant because this framework provides an alternate explanation for such a shift that attributes 
more coherence to the Court’s jurisprudence. This is because, instead of asserting that the shift 
towards localism stems from the Court’s attempts to promote the “values” inherent in federalism, my 
framework would instead attribute such a shift to the Court’s more nuanced, modern attempts to 
protect traditional, dual-sovereignty federalism. See supra note 8. That is, to the extent that the Court 
now shows greater solicitude to local governments in certain instances than it once did, my 
framework suggests the Court does so because—recognizing that local governments derive their 
powers from the states that created them or put in place the mechanisms that allowed for their 
creation—the Court recognizes that, in some instances, respecting local governments is important to 
respect state decisions regarding the creation of these governments. Thus, even to the extent that my 
conclusion that there has not been a shift in the Court’s relevant jurisprudence over time is not 
correct, my framework is still relevant in suggesting that local governments only enjoy derivative, 
not independent, status in the constitutional hierarchy. 
 47. Although I don’t discuss other relevant scholarship that examines and attempts to explain 
the apparent inconsistency in the Court’s local government jurisprudence, I recognize that other 
explanations have been advanced. For example, some scholars attempt to explain portions of the 
Court’s local government jurisprudence without referencing federalism or explicitly recognizing that 
cases involve local governments. James A. Gardner attempted to explain inconsistency in the 
Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. Gardner concluded that the proper background principle for 
explaining these decisions was a communitarian one—that is, that the Court’s voting rights 
jurisprudence favors claims that are based on assertions that voters who are “members of the 
relevant political community” are being deprived of the franchise. James A. Gardner, Liberty, 
Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to 
Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 910 (1997). Gardner also pointed out that other voting rights claims 
generally fail where these claims are instead based on notions of “protective democracy”—that is, 
whether individuals claim they are being remotely “governed by a political community different 
from the one to which they belong[].” See id. at 910–11. Ultimately, Gardner explained that the 
source of the Court’s apparently confused jurisprudence was its “fail[ure] to distinguish between the 
two theories,” or its choices to “speak[] the language of one concept while acting according to the 
other.” Id. at 982. Gardner suggests that the Court should fix its troubled jurisprudence by adopting a 
“coherent political theory.” See id. at 985. Nevertheless, while interesting, such articles do not 
contribute substantially to the overall dialogue relating to the appropriate constitutional status of 
localities, since such articles focus directly on other topics, ignoring the nuance introduced into the 
equation by local governments. 
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allows me to propose a more cohesive explanation for the Court’s 
jurisprudence than any prior scholar because the observation obviates the 
need for accepting that the Court’s thinking about local governments has 
shifted over time. 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE DUAL-FACETED FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK 
As highlighted above, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to 
the federal constitutional status of local governments appears facially 
inconsistent. And no prior scholar has yet been able to present a cohesive 
framework that rationally explains how the Court views municipalities. 
This section of the Comment attempts to provide such a descriptive 
framework. 
As explained earlier, federalism provides the unifying principle that 
allows for rationalization of all the relevant cases—and permits the 
development of this Comment’s proposed framework.48 That federalism 
is the appropriate rationalizing principle is best illustrated by returning to 
Milliken and Hunter. Although, as noted previously, in Hunter the Court 
viewed the local government at issue (Allegheny) as a mere subdivision 
of the state,49 while in Milliken the Court viewed the local government at 
issue (Detroit School District) as an independent actor,50 a conclusion 
that these cases are inconsistent with one another is erroneous. The cases 
are actually consistent with one another when they are viewed against the 
background norm of federalism. That is, the local government 
conceptualization adopted by the Court in each of the two cases allowed 
the state to have relatively free reign in structuring the relevant local 
government as it saw fit. 
 
Other commentators do not ignore the jurisprudential nuance introduced by local 
governments, but focus exclusively on cases within one area of the Court’s local government 
jurisprudence. For example, one student Comment attempted to rationally explain local government 
suits directly against the states that created them. See generally Brian P. Keenan, Comment, 
Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause: Can a Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent State 
Under Federal Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2004–2005). This student, in arguing that local 
governments should be able to sue state governments in certain instances, argued that those prior 
cases that had involved suits by local governments against the states that had created them could be 
rationally explained simply by looking at the “[constitutional] clauses at issue in th[ose] cases.” Id. 
at 1905. The problem with this approach, though, is that through its myopic focus on only one type 
of case, it fails to answer the broader question of how the Court generally views local governments. 
 48. See supra note 8. 
 49. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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In Hunter, because the state had adopted laws whereby the city of 
Allegheny could be merged out of existence, the Court best respected the 
will of the state by allowing the city to be merged. On the other hand, in 
Milliken the state had chosen to create school districts and presumably 
did not want the lines that it had allowed to be drawn on the map to be 
ignored. So, to give effect to the state’s wishes, the Court had to respect 
the existence of the school districts that the state had chosen to create, 
although ignoring these school district boundary lines and imposing a 
metropolitan-area-wide remedy might have allowed the Court to fashion 
a more effective remedy. 
This recognition that federalism seems to play a role in explaining 
the results in Hunter and Milliken, though important, is not sufficient by 
itself for two reasons. First, this bare recognition fails to provide a 
principled framework into which other relevant cases could be inserted. 
Second, this bare recognition fails to provide a nuanced description of 
how federalism functionally operates in each of the two cases (and other 
cases). In particular, this recognition ignores the fact that in Hunter the 
Court found that there was no constitutional violation at all, thus 
choosing not to provide any remedy whatsoever,51 whereas in Milliken 
the Court found that there was a constitutional violation, yet chose to 
impose a narrow remedy.52 
The dual-faceted federalism framework proposed below does not 
ignore either of these two important considerations. 
A. Proposed Descriptive Framework 
This Comment’s proposed dual-faceted federalism framework has 
two prongs. These prongs operate in sequential fashion, with each prong 
operating as a rebuttable presumption. The analysis under the first prong 
(“Prong 1”) determines whether the state has violated the Constitution in 
the structuring of its local governments, cautioning the Court against 
finding a constitutional violation in the first instance. The analysis under 
the second prong (“Prong 2”) determines the scope of the remedy that the 
Court should impose in a circumstance where it finds a violation, 
counseling the Court to minimally invade a state’s sovereign choices 
even in those circumstances where the Court finds a constitutional 
violation. 
 
 51. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–81 (1907). 
 52. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–46, 752–53 (1974). 
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Given that my discussion of the details of the framework is relatively 
complex, it is important that the reader maintain in mind my purpose for 
presenting a nuanced description of the framework. The implications of 
my proposed, two-part framework—if it is accurate—are relatively 
straightforward. Particularly, my framework illustrates that local 
governments enjoy only derivative status in the constitutional hierarchy. 
That is, if federalism cautions the Court against even finding violations 
in the state’s decisions about how to structure its municipalities, then in 
cases where the Prong 1 presumption is not overcome, the result is 
deference to the state’s choices about how to structure its municipalities, 
whether the state made those decisions directly or indirectly by enabling 
local governments to act in certain ways. This deference may or may not 
require the Court to “recognize” the existence and importance of a 
particular local government entity. Nevertheless, in either case the local 
government entity has no “independent” status in the constitutional 
hierarchy, acquiring whatever status it has derivatively from its maker 
and its maker’s wishes regarding it.53 
If, though, the Prong 1 presumption is overcome, then some 
interference with the state’s decisions about how to structure its 
municipalities is inevitable. Supremacy of federal law dictates as much. 
Thus, the Prong 2 presumption comes into play. Nevertheless, under 
Prong 2, the Court will still limit its remedy as much as possible to avoid 
undue infringement of state sovereign prerogatives. The Court’s efforts 
to avoid such interference can give the illusion that the local government 
has independent constitutional status, because the Court generally limits 
its remedy to the offending government. But the motivation underlying 
the Court’s efforts is deference to the state’s decisions about how to 
structure its municipalities. Thus, any “independent” constitutional status 
is actually just derivative, derived from the state’s decisions about how to 
structure its local government entities. 
In rare instances, where the Prong 2 inquiry suggests that a state has 
purposefully used its power to structure a local government in order to 
deprive individuals of constitutionally guaranteed rights, the Court 
simply disregards the particular, purposeful state action that led to the 
deprivation of these rights. In these rare instances, the Court might 
 
 53. If local governments enjoyed “independent status” in the constitutional hierarchy, the 
Court would instead be required to automatically take cognizance of these governments’ existence 
and importance. 
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actually ignore a state’s local government structuring decision, although 
this result is not inevitable. That is, in circumstances where the particular 
offending state decision involved the creation or modification of the 
boundaries of a particular local government, by ignoring the 
impermissible state decision, the Court might completely or partially 
ignore that particular local government entity. On the other hand, where 
the offending state decision instead dealt with either granting powers to 
local government entities or limiting their powers, the Court’s decision to 
disregard the state’s offending decision might instead lead to either an 
augmenting or diminishing of local government powers, without leading 
the Court to necessarily disregard the local government entity all 
together. Thus, even in these circumstances, the status of local 
governments is merely derivative, since they will only be completely 
disregarded in those circumstances where the very act of creating or 
modifying them represented an illegitimate exercise of state power. 
Circumstances where the Prong 2 presumption is overcome are rare, 
though, and the Court is reticent to ignore the state’s decisions about 
ordering its local governments. Although, the Court is willing to do so 
where such action is necessary in order to impose an effective remedy. 
Such action in these limited circumstances is justified to preserve the 
supremacy of federal law. 
Therefore, in summary, in nearly all instances, the Court respects—
to some degree—the states’ choices about how to structure their local 
governments, only completely disregarding the states’ choices where the 
states have acted purposefully in violating constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. Together, then, this framework suggests that any significance ever 
afforded to local governments is only derivative, which in turn suggests 
that local governments do not have independent constitutional status. 
This explanation of the implications of my framework was presented 
here to remind the reader not to get lost in the details of my presentation 
of the framework, forgetting the purpose for which the framework is 
presented. While the presentation of the framework will likely modestly 
improve ability to predict the outcome of future cases, the primary reason 
for presenting the nuanced discussion below is to convince the reader 
that my two-pronged framework is correct as a descriptive matter, 
because persuading the reader that my framework is adequate as a 
descriptive matter is probably a necessary antecedent to persuading the 
reader that this Comment’s conclusions about the federal constitutional 
status of local governments—which, as shown by the discussion in the 
foregoing paragraph, flow quite naturally from the simple presentation of 
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the  
 
dual pronged federalism presumption above—are descriptively accurate. 
1. Framework Prong 1 – determining whether there is a violation 
necessitating some remedy 
The first prong of this framework—the more complex and 
admittedly less determinative of the two parts—provides operational 
content to federalism by limiting the likelihood that the Court will find 
that a state’s choices about structuring its local governments are 
constitutionally impermissible in the first instance, thereby minimizing 
the number of judicial incursions upon state sovereignty. 
This prong of the framework sets up a rebuttable presumption that 
decisions a state makes about structuring its municipalities are 
constitutionally permissible. While this principle appears relatively 
simple on its face, the key complexity arises in identifying those factors 
that are useful in predicting whether the first presumption has been 
overcome in a particular case. The subsequent paragraphs attempt to 
identify such factors. 
In identifying these factors, it is useful to begin the inquiry by 
identifying the key policy tension in the Court’s relevant jurisprudence. 
Although often only implicit, the relevant cases show that the Court’s 
precedent attempts to balance the competing values of federalism and 
supremacy.54 Unfortunately, however, because the Court’s cases in this 
area are nearly always comparative (e.g., the Court already applied one-
person, one-vote to one particular type of government entity, and now 
 
 54. This tension is more explicit in the related context of the Nixon clear-statement rule, 
where the Court has explicitly imposed a clear-statement rule upon Congress for those times when it 
attempts to interfere with the structure of local governments by providing such governments with 
authority or power that the states did not choose to give to them. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 
541 U.S. 125, 140–41 (2004). Arguably, whereas the Nixon clear-statement rule restrains the 
legislative and executive branches in their attempts to infringe on state rights to structure local 
government as the states see fit, the dual-pronged federalism presumption proposed by this 
Comment similarly makes the other federal branch—the judiciary—take pause before interfering 
with the mechanisms by which states have chosen to govern themselves. Like the Nixon clear-
statement rule, the dual-faceted federalism check I propose in this Comment operates only as a 
presumption, thereby preserving the supremacy of federal law. Both the Nixon rule and the clear-
statement rule proposed by this Comment are manifestations of the tension between the federal and 
state governments that Chief Justice John Marshall famously observed “is perpetually arising, and 
will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316, 405 (1817). 
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the Court is seeking to determine whether this same stricture should be 
applied to another government entity), the Court’s use of prior precedent 
obscures what otherwise would be the explicit resolution of the inherent 
tension between these two values. 
To determine what the Court’s analysis would look like if it were 
forced to engage in this balancing inquiry directly—by explicitly 
resolving the tension between supremacy and federalism—it is useful to 
engage in a thought experiment. This thought experiment asks what 
factors the Court would weigh if it were forced to explicitly confront the 
tension between federalism and supremacy in a particular case without 
the crutch of prior precedent upon which to rely. I propose that the 
Court’s inquiry in such a world would likely have two principal aspects. 
First, the Court would attempt to assess the extent to which a 
fundamental right would be compromised by its failure to impose a 
restriction in a particular case. In making this assessment the Court 
would explicitly weigh (a) the relative importance, in the constitutional 
rights pantheon, of the right that the petitioner alleges has been deprived, 
and (b) the degree of encroachment upon this right that is actually 
occasioned by the particular state municipality-structuring decision 
before the Court. 
Second, the Court would balance its determination under the first 
aspect of the inquiry against an assessment of the degree of incursion 
upon state sovereignty that would be occasioned by imposition of the 
restriction. 
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This theoretical inquiry (“Theoretical Inquiry”) suggests that a 
relatively greater encroachment upon a relatively more important right 
would be required for the Court to impose a restriction in a circumstance 
where imposition of the restriction necessary to protect the right would 
lead to a relatively greater encroachment upon state sovereignty. 
Alternately, it suggests that a relatively lesser encroachment upon a 
relatively less significant right would be required if imposition of such a 
restriction would lead to a relatively more minimal incursion upon state 
sovereignty. 
The relationship between the three relevant factors in the Theoretical 
Inquiry can be visualized by imagining a three-dimensional graph with 
three axes (X, Y, and Z), any two of which are at perpendicular, ninety-
degree angles from one another, and which intersect at a single point (the 
“Origin”).55  
 
The X axis would be labeled “relative importance of the right the 
 
 55. See Visualization of Cartesian Coordinates in Three Dimensions, THE UNIV. OF SYDNEY, 
http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au/u/MOW/vectors/vectors-7/v-7-1.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2009). 
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petitioner alleges has been deprived,” with the importance of the right 
increasing in proportion to the distance away from the Origin. The Y axis 
would be labeled “the degree of encroachment upon this right occasioned 
by the state’s decision about how to structure its municipal government,” 
with relative encroachment upon the right increasing in proportion to the 
distance away from the Origin. The Z axis would represent the “degree 
of incursion upon state sovereignty that would be occasioned by 
imposition of the sought-after restriction,” with relatively greater 
incursion on state sovereignty falling closer to the Origin. This imaginary 
graph could be subdivided into two areas. The area closer to the Origin 
would be called the “zone of federalism,” or the area within which 
Courts would be unwilling to impose any sort of restriction on the state’s 
structuring of its subdivisions to protect a particular right. Beyond this 
zone, however, the remainder of the graph would be called the “area of 
supremacy.” This area of supremacy would represent the area in which a 
Court would be willing to impose some sort of restriction upon a state’s 
ordering of a local government to protect a particular right. Any given 
instance of encroachment upon a particular right would be represented by 
a single point on the graph. The farther away from the Origin this point 
fell, the greater the likelihood that it would fall within the “area of 
supremacy.” However, because in each instance the process of plotting 
would begin at the Origin and move outward, there would be a natural, 
rebuttable presumption that, unless the relevant factors suggested 
otherwise, the Court would not impose a restriction, because the zone of 
federalism lies closer to the Origin. 
When viewed in isolation, these insights available from the 
Theoretical Inquiry and hypothetical graph above appear less than 
impressive. Besides appearing somewhat obvious, the conclusions based 
upon the Theoretical Inquiry almost appear completely useless, as a 
practical matter. This is because the standards—such as “relative 
importance” and “degree of encroachment”—that appear in the 
Theoretical Inquiry and on the graph axes would, standing alone, provide 
mostly rudderless and minimal—if any—predictive guidance. 
Nonetheless, the Theoretical Inquiry and hypothetical graph are not 
useless. Indeed, they become extremely useful when it is recalled that the 
Court’s actual jurisprudence does not generally engage in a pattern of 
inquiry that follows the pattern set forth in the Theoretical Inquiry. 
Rather, the Court engages in a proxy for this inquiry that resolves the 
inherent tension between federalism and supremacy implicitly through 
the device of comparative precedent. 
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In its basic form, the Court’s actual comparative inquiry asks a 
question that is eminently more ascertainable than the questions posed by 
the Theoretical Inquiry. It asks whether the Court’s prior precedents 
justify imposing a particular restriction on the local government entity 
that is before the Court. While this inquiry concededly lacks scientific 
precision, it is not as completely rudderless as the bare Theoretical 
Inquiry discussed above because it allows the prognosticator to take 
guidance from earlier precedents, either distinguishing or analogizing to 
earlier cases in which the Court has or has not imposed restrictions on 
other municipalities.56 Nevertheless, standing alone, the comparative 
standard is also a weak predictive tool, because it does not reveal which 
factors are or should be relevant in making this comparison. 
This is where the Theoretical Inquiry becomes instrumental. The 
suggestion that the Court’s comparative precedential inquiry is merely a 
proxy for the Theoretical Inquiry is extremely valuable because it 
highlights that the Theoretical Inquiry can help identify which factors are 
relevant in the Court’s comparative jurisprudence. That is, by using the 
insights garnered from the Theoretical Inquiry as a paradigm for viewing 
the Court’s actual comparative jurisprudence, we can hopefully identify 
and extract those substantive factors that the Court uses in its 
comparative analysis as proxy factors to approximate the “pure” analysis 
under the Theoretical Inquiry. We can then use these factors to better 
predict the outcomes of future comparative analyses by the Court, 
because these factors should allow us to identify those distinctions 
between cases that are relevant and those that are not. Thus, we can 
assess the boundaries of the zone of federalism and area of supremacy on 
our imaginary graph by comparative proxy. 
We begin by turning to the first dimension of the Theoretical Inquiry 
and asking which comparative proxy factors would be relevant in 
determining “the extent to which a fundamental right would be 
compromised by a failure to impose a restriction.” 
Under the first element (the “X Axis” inquiry in our hypothetical 
graph above) of the first dimension Theoretical Inquiry, we ask what 
comparative factors would serve as effective proxies to help the Court 
 
 56. While it is possible to conceive of some cases in which earlier analogous precedents 
might not provide meaningful guidance, such instances are likely to be quite rare given that, 
generally, most of the Court’s jurisprudence within this area falls within only a few limited 
categories (e.g., one-person, one-vote or Contracts Clause challenges). Thus, for the vast majority of 
cases, prior precedent will likely provide significant guidance. 
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implicitly ask the pure Theoretical Inquiry of “the relative importance, in 
the constitutional rights pantheon, of the right that the petitioner alleges 
has been deprived.” 
Probably, the primary inquiry under this element is one that seeks to 
determine whether the Court has already imposed restrictions on other 
local governments to protect the particular right; such an imposition 
suggests that, at least in some instances, supremacy might outweigh 
federalism, thereby justifying imposition of a restriction. In instances 
where the Court has not previously protected the same right, another 
relevant inquiry is whether the Court has protected similar rights in the 
past. In determining whether the Court has imposed similar restrictions, 
the Court might compare the source of the alleged right with the source 
of other rights for which the Court has previously imposed restrictions. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that it is somewhat 
more likely to impose restrictions upon the states based upon the 
Reconstruction Amendments, because these Amendments were arguably 
meant to impose restrictions that the states should not be able to subvert 
through their local-government-ordering decisions.57 The Court’s 
jurisprudence also indicates that the Court is more likely to impose a 
restriction where the specific right violated is an individual right 
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,58 instead of a right that a local 
government asserts directly against the state.59 This also makes sense, 
given that one of the purposes of federalism is to protect individual 
rights.60 Consequently, federalism counsels interference much more 
strongly in instances where individual rights are at stake, and, alternately, 
counsels strongly against interference where cities claim rights under the 
Constitution as against their makers, since the risk of undue interference 
 
 57. Cf., e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (suggesting that certain 
constitutional provisions—including the Fifteenth Amendment—place greater restrictions on states 
in the structuring of their local governments than others). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 60. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–64 (2011) (“The individual, in a 
proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that 
federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State . . . . The limitations that 
federalism entails are not therefore a matter of right belonging only to the States. States are not the 
sole intended beneficiaries of federalism. An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that 
upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States when the 
enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to 
principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.”). 
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with state sovereignty is at its greatest height in such instances.61 
Moving on to the second element (the “Y Axis” inquiry in our 
hypothetical graph above) of the first dimension of the Theoretical 
Inquiry, we next ask what comparative proxies the Court uses to 
implicitly ask the pure Theoretical Inquiry of the “degree of 
encroachment upon the right that is actually occasioned by the particular 
state decision about how to structure a municipality.” This inquiry 
recognizes that not every assertion that a state has trammeled upon a 
right—even an important right—establishes that the right has been 
infringed. The primary proxy inquiry here is one that is more contextual 
than the one discussed above, in the sense that it pays greater attention to 
the particular type of government entity before the Court. Here, the 
Court’s primary inquiry likely asks whether the Court has previously 
imposed a restriction on a similar type of local government entity in 
order to protect the right, or a similar right. In looking at its prior case 
law, the Court might examine the extent of governmental power 
exercised by the particular local government entity before the Court over 
the petitioner vis-à-vis the governmental power exercised by other 
entities upon the petitioners in those cases in which the Court has 
previously imposed the same or similar restrictions. This inquiry 
recognizes that local governmental entities with broad, general 
governmental powers are more likely to be able to significantly impede 
individual rights than those entities that exercise limited, insignificant 
powers.62 Similarly, the Court would likely examine whether it had 
previously imposed analogous restrictions on the states in order to 
protect the asserted right, and would further ask whether failure to 
protect the right at the local government level would make the right 
guaranteed at the state level significantly less meaningful, since 
supremacy counsels less interference in instances where the effective 
substance of a right is already protected.63 Finally, the Court would 
 
 61. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its 
government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a 
sovereign.”). 
 62. Compare City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (involving application of 
one-person, one-vote to a bond election for a municipality that exercised broad powers) with Holt 
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (choosing to not extend one-person, one-vote 
to the extraterritorial residents of the contiguous zone outside of the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 
noting that the city exercised relatively small amounts of governmental power in this contiguous 
zone). 
 63. This might be the case where the Supreme Court has previously determined that a 
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likely assess whether the record reveals that the state has acted more 
purposefully in attempting to deprive individuals of the asserted right 
than in other cases in which the Court has previously imposed 
restrictions, recognizing the fact that federalism values are significantly 
weakened where the states illegitimately use their power to purposefully 
impede constitutionally guaranteed rights.64 
We next turn to the second dimension of our Theoretical Inquiry (the 
“Z axis” inquiry in our hypothetical graph above). We seek comparative 
proxies for the Theoretical Inquiry that consider the “degree of incursion 
upon state sovereignty that would be occasioned by imposition of the 
restriction” upon a particular entity. Given that all federal impositions 
trammel upon state sovereignty to some degree, examination of the cases 
reveals that the only real comparative inquiry considers which particular 
restrictions previously have been imposed upon the particular type of 
local government entity before the Court.65 To the extent that the same 
restriction has been imposed on the same type of local government entity 
in the past, it suggests that the entity can survive imposition of such a 
restriction. On the other hand, to the extent that the Court has not 
imposed a similar restriction on this type of local government in the past, 
it is necessary to examine where on the spectrum (ranging from 
municipal government exercising a broad range of power to quasi-private 
corporation financed publicly) of governmental entities the particular 
local government falls, and compare this with other local governmental 
entities upon which the Court has previously imposed such past 
 
particular restriction applies to the states (e.g., need for relatively proportional apportionment in state 
elections) and extension of the same restriction to municipal governments is necessary to 
meaningfully protect the right (e.g., given that much power is exercised at the local level, arguably if 
the Supreme Court had required relatively proportional apportionment in only state elections, but not 
in local governmental elections, the meaningfulness of the right to equal vote in state elections 
would be diminished, because states delegate much of their power to local governments). See, e.g., 
Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
 64. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (imposing a remedy in a 
circumstance where the state had purposefully drawn the lines of the city in order to exclude black 
voters). 
 65. Thus, this proxy inquiry is quite similar to the “Y axis” inquiry above, in that it focuses 
on particular restrictions vis-à-vis particular types of government entities. The difference in these 
inquiries, though, stems from their focus. Whereas the “Y axis” inquiry focuses on the effect of the 
particular restriction on a petitioner’s rights, the “Z axis” inquiry focuses on the effect of the 
imposition of a restriction upon a particular local government that the state has chosen to create. 
Thus, asking a fairly similar proxy question two times, yields multiple groups of insights. 
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restrictions.66 If the Court has already imposed the same restriction on an 
entity that is less like a general government and more like a private 
entity, then we can confidently predict that the Court will likely impose 
the restriction. To the extent it has not done so, the Court is less likely to 
impose the restriction. This step in the inquiry allows the Court to 
account for the fact that many types of quasi-governmental entities that 
states choose to create would not be created at all were certain 
constitutional restrictions (e.g., one-person, one-vote) applied to them. 
The affront to a state’s dignity from imposing a constitutional restriction 
on one if its subdivisions reaches its greatest level in those instances 
where the Court’s choice to impose a restriction would likely come at the 
cost of destroying a particular type of government.67 
Having identified, by using the lens of the Court’s comparative 
inquiry, those relevant factors that likely would serve as proxies for the 
Court’s Theoretical Inquiry, we can return to our imaginary, three-
dimensional graph. Recognizing that the comparative proxies we 
identified are simply substitutes for our X, Y, and Z axis inquiries under 
the pure Theoretical Inquiry allows us to recognize that we can roughly 
“derive” the “zone of federalism” and “area of supremacy” on our 
theoretical graph indirectly through our comparative inquiry. In other 
words, by using the comparative proxy factors identified in the foregoing 
paragraphs as substitutes for the X, Y, and Z axes labels under the pure 
Theoretical Inquiry, we can plot the Court’s precedents that are relevant 
to the current issue on the graph, creating an imaginary, three-
dimensional scatter plot. If we imagine that we “color” these points two 
colors, one color representing circumstances in which the Court has 
chosen to impose some sort of restriction, and the other color 
representing those circumstances in which the Court has not chosen to do 
 
 66. This type of inquiry is illustrated in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), where the Court 
spent a significant portion of its opinion trying to determine whether the local governmental entity at 
issue was more like the governmental entity in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973), upon which the government had not chosen to impose one-person, 
one-vote restrictions, or whether it was more like the governments on which it had imposed one-
person, one-vote restrictions in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970), and in other 
similar cases. 
 67. Although not a Supreme Court case, the Second Circuit case of Kessler v. Grand Central 
District Management Ass’n, Inc., 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998), referring to Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 
355 (1981), suggested that this notion was implicit in the Court’s Ball opinion, noting that “the State 
legislature could reasonably have concluded that property owners, unless given principal control 
over how the money is spent, would not have consented to having their property subject to the 
assessment.” Kessler, 158 F.3d at 108. 
4.CANNON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
1585 A Federalism Framework and Local Governments 
 1613 
so, then by connecting those points of similar color, we can “derive” a 
rough estimate of the zone of federalism and area of supremacy. We can 
then “plot” the current issue before the Court on this graph in order to 
predict whether the Court will impose some sort of remedy in a particular 
case. 
In other words, to determine whether the Prong 1 presumption of 
constitutionally permissible entity structuring has been overcome, the 
Court simply determines whether the point it has drawn on the scatter 
plot falls within or without the zone of federalism. If the presumption has 
not been overcome (i.e., the point on the imaginary scatter plot falls 
within the “zone of federalism”), the Court simply finds that there has 
been no constitutional violation, dismissing the case. Therefore, if the 
Court determines that the presumption under Prong 1 of the analysis has 
not been overcome, the Court best respects the states by allowing them 
free reign in structuring their local governments. If, on the other hand, 
the Court determines that the Prong 1 presumption has been overcome 
(i.e., the point on the imaginary scatter plot falls within the “area of 
supremacy”), then the Court engages in Prong 2 of the inquiry regarding 
the presumption. 
While my description of the framework in the preceding paragraphs 
might suggest that I am attempting to claim the ability to predict whether 
a Court will or will not impose a remedy in future cases with 
mathematical precision, I will be the first to disclaim any such notion. I 
recognize that my proposed method does not offer mathematical 
precision and that use of the proposed method will often produce 
indeterminate results. Nonetheless, the method is valuable for several 
reasons. First, by using the proposed Theoretical Inquiry as a lens 
through which to view the actual comparative inquiry used by the Court, 
we were able to attempt to identify those factors that are relevant to the 
Court as it is engaging in its comparative inquiry,68 thus likely modestly 
 
 68. Although I believe that the factors I have identified are some of the factors driving the 
Court’s analysis in the relevant case law, in reality the validity of my assertions regarding the dual-
faceted federalism framework are not even directly dependent upon my having identified the correct 
factors that are relevant to the Court as it engages in its inquiry. This is because my primary 
assertion is simply that local governments enjoy only derivative status in the federal constitutional 
hierarchy. In order to prove this point, I assert that federalism plays two roles in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, (1) limiting the likelihood that a Court will find that a state has violated the 
Constitution at all in structuring its local governments, and (2) counseling the Court, in 
circumstances where it does impose some remedy, to limit its remedy so as to only minimally 
interfere with state sovereignty. The more specific factors I have identified are simply intended to 
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increasing the chance that any particular prediction will be correct. More 
importantly, though, to the extent that this framework is accurate as a 
descriptive matter, it allows me to suggest something important about the 
constitutional status of local governments. Having reiterated my limited 
purpose in articulating this descriptive framework, I move onward to 
discuss Prong 2. 
2. Framework Prong 2 – assessing the scope of the remedy 
Under Prong 2 of the dual-faceted federalism framework, the Court 
assesses what restriction it should place on a state subdivision. Although 
the overcoming of the Prong 1 presumption necessitates the imposition 
of some restriction, the federalism presumption nonetheless counsels the 
Court to tailor its remedy as narrowly as possible. This tailoring ensures 
that the Court’s interference with a state’s choices about structuring its 
local governments is as minimally invasive as possible. Nevertheless, 
just as federalism operates as a presumption under Prong 1 of the 
inquiry, federalism once again acts merely as a presumption at Step 2, 
not as an absolute bar on Court action. In particular, Prong 2 creates a 
presumption of not ignoring those lines that states have chosen to draw 
on the map (i.e., a presumption that the remedy will be geographically 
tailored to the smallest possible offending area). 
 
Mercifully, it is much easier to determine when the Prong 2 
presumption has been rebutted. Instead of wading into the quagmire of 
factors considered under Prong 1, the Prong 2 presumption is only 
rebutted in a single circumstance. That circumstance occurs where the 
evidence shows that the state has structured its municipalities so as to 
purposefully violate individual rights. In such a circumstance, the Court 
simply disregards the purposefully discriminatory decision. While 
disregarding such a decision does not inevitably mean that the local 
government itself is disregarded, this is often the result where the 
offending state decision is to create or modify that local government. 
This result makes good sense as a matter of policy. To the extent that 
a state has acted purposefully in attempting to structure its subdivisions 
 
buttress my assertion that federalism plays two roles in the relevant jurisprudence. Thus, as long as 
the reader accepts my premise that one of the dual roles of federalism will be operative in a 
particular case, it does not matter whether the reader accepts the particular factors that I have 
identified. 
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in a way that would deprive individuals of federally guaranteed 
constitutional rights (for example, by drawing city boundary lines in a 
manner intended to restrict minority voting rights),69 the state has shown 
it is irresponsible and must be checked. After all, in addition to 
protecting the states, as previously noted, federalism serves to protect 
individual rights.70 On the other hand, if a state itself has not acted 
purposefully to deprive individuals of certain constitutionally guaranteed 
rights, the Court should feel more at liberty to constrain its remedy to the 
particular state subdivision that has been guilty of infringement, because 
the state itself has not shown that it is incapable or unwilling to safeguard 
individual rights. In other words, federalism counsels a narrow remedy in 
those cases where state actors have not acted purposefully, because, in 
such cases, it is possible to protect the state from undue federal 
interference while also adequately protecting individual rights. But, 
where states have acted purposefully to deprive individuals of federal 
constitutional rights, there is no legitimate reason to protect the states 
from federal interference—the states’ actions are illegitimate, so the only 
relevant federalism interest at stake is in protecting individual rights.  
Having proposed this descriptive framework, I will now deploy it to 
explain some of the Court’s relevant local government jurisprudence. 
3. Application of the framework 
 While space and time constraints will not permit a comprehensive 
presentation of all the relevant cases that might be discussed here, I 
discuss four cases that allow for effective illustration of this Comment’s 
proposed framework in action. Three of these cases—Hunter, Milliken,71 
and Ball—were chosen because they each illustrate the three Briffault 
conceptualizations of municipalities and also illustrate how the apparent 
inconsistencies between these conceptualizations disappear when viewed 
in light of this Comment’s proposed framework. The facts of these cases 
were presented in Part II, so they should already be familiar to the reader. 
The fourth of these cases—Gomillion—was chosen, because it illustrates 
one of those relatively rare instances where both the Prong 1 and Prong 2 
presumptions were overcome. This case was not discussed above in Part 
 
 69. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 71. It is fortunate that this discussion of these four cases permits us to return to the paradigm 
inconsistency used throughout this Comment—the inconsistency between Hunter and Milliken. 
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II, so I provide more comprehensive discussion of its facts before 
applying this Comment’s framework to the case.72 
Together, these four cases will allow me to illustrate each of the 
three possible outcomes under my proposed framework: (1) situations 
where the Prong 1 presumption is not overcome, so no Prong 2 analysis 
is necessary (Hunter and Ball); (2) situations where the Prong 1 
presumption is overcome, but the Prong 2 presumption is not overcome 
(Milliken); and (3) situations where both the Prong 1 and Prong 2 
presumptions are overcome (Gomillion). Although in this Part I do not 
comprehensively analyze all the cases previously discussed in Part II, in 
footnotes that follow, I briefly suggest where these cases, along with 
certain other cases, might fit. 
Once again, before presenting these cases, I caution the reader that 
although I do suggest relevant factors that the Court might have 
considered in determining what type of role federalism would play in a 
given case (e.g., whether it would play a Prong 1 or Prong 2 role), my 
principal purpose is not to perfectly explain which individual factors are 
relevant in the Court’s analysis. Rather, my primary purpose is to assert 
that federalism occupies dual roles in the Court’s local government 
jurisprudence. To the extent I am correct in this assertion, my theory that 
local governments enjoy only derivative status in the constitutional 
hierarchy will be corroborated. 
 a. Outcome number one: Prong 1 presumption not rebutted. The first 
of three possible outcomes available under this Comment’s proposed 
framework exists where the Prong 1 presumption is not overcome, such 
that no Prong 2 analysis is necessary. Hunter and Ball effectively 
illustrate this outcome. Although these cases apparently involve different 
conceptualizations of municipalities, the cases are actually consistent 
when viewed through the lens of this Comment’s proposed framework. 
Recall that Hunter—a case that fits within the first of Briffault’s 
three conceptualizations of municipalities—involved a situation where 
the laws of Pennsylvania permitted the joining of two contiguous 
municipalities based on a vote of the collective populations of both cities. 
When the city of Pittsburgh tried to annex its contiguous neighbor, 
Allegheny, the residents of Allegheny balked and brought suit. The 
 
 72. Gomillion was not presented in Part II, because I feel that it does not fit neatly into one of 
Briffault’s three proposed conceptualizations. 
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Supreme Court, using very strong language, rejected the residents’ 
challenge, suggesting that Allegheny could not sue to prevent the merger 
because cities have no independent status in the constitutional 
hierarchy.73 
Ball, unlike Hunter, fits within the third of Briffault’s three 
conceptualizations of municipalities. In Ball, the Court examined a one-
person, one-vote challenge involving a special improvement district 
election. Voting within this district (the “Power District”) was limited to 
certain property owners who owned sufficiently large tracts of land. 
Although the Court had previously imposed one-person, one-vote 
requirements on other local government elections, ultimately the Court 
refused to apply any such restriction on the Power District.74 
Thus, Hunter and Ball appeared to adopt different conceptualizations 
of the constitutional status of local governments, because the Hunter 
Court completely disregarded the city of Allegheny, whereas the Ball 
Court recognized and respected the importance and existence of the 
Power District. But both cases can be fully explained by noting that in 
neither case was the constitutional case sufficiently compelling to justify 
the imposition of any restriction on the state’s ability to freely structure 
its municipalities (i.e., both cases involved Prong 1 of the proposed 
federalism framework). 
Although Hunter involved an entity (a city) that operated as a 
general government, suggesting that the Court might have been more 
likely to impose some sort of restriction in order to protect rights, the 
particular right at issue was not a very compelling one. First of all, the 
Court did not perceive the right at issue as an individual one, dismissing 
the notion that individual residents of Allegheny had somehow acquired 
vested rights in the existence of the city. Instead, the Court functionally 
viewed the dispute as one directly between the local government and its 
state. This was significant, because, although the Court previously had 
imposed restrictions on the otherwise free ability of states to structure 
their local governments based on the Contracts Clause, these cases had 
involved assertions that individual rights (generally the rights of 
creditors) were infringed on by the state action. By contrast, the Court 
had previously held in City of Trenton and in Dartmouth College that the 
Contracts Clause did not provide the same protection to municipal 
 
 73. See discussion supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 74. See discussion supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
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corporations that it did to private parties.75  
Therefore, the Court’s conclusion that this case did not involve 
individual rights, along with the Court’s earlier precedents suggesting 
that there was minimal,if any,infringement of rights in analogous 
situations, likely convinced the Court that the state should be free to 
structure its municipalities in the manner it saw fit.76 
The Ball Court reached a similar result, ultimately concluding that 
the state should be permitted to structure its municipalities in the manner 
it saw fit, although the case was likely a closer one. This is so because 
the right at issue—voting—was a significant, individual right, 
attributable to the Reconstruction Amendments that had already been 
applied to the states and had previously been applied to other local 
governments. Nevertheless, unlike Hunter, Ball did not involve a general 
purpose government, but instead involved a special purpose district. This 
special purpose government exercised relatively limited and arguably 
insignificant powers. This special purpose district originally had been 
created as a private entity, and had only been converted into a quasi-
public entity to take advantage of certain financial benefits available to 
such entities. Furthermore, when the Court previously examined whether 
to apply the same restriction (one-person, one-vote) to a similar local 
government entity in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District77 the Court concluded that the specific right at issue—
the right to vote—was inapplicable, thus suggesting that the Court had 
already determined that applying such a right to this type of entity might 
trammel significantly upon such entities because states might no longer 
create them. Therefore, although the right at issue was an important one, 
the Court likely concluded that the right would not significantly be 
 
 75. This previously settled law—derived from City of Trenton and Dartmouth College—
regarding the ability of states to freely structure their municipalities explains why, absent an 
allegation that the state’s structuring of local governments was intended to deprive individuals of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights, city challenges to state action under the Contracts Clause 
generally do not overcome the presumption of constitutionality under Prong 1 of the dual-faceted 
federalism framework. 
 76. If we imagine that we plot the unique facts of Hunter as a single point on our 
hypothetical, three-dimensional graph that was examined as part of this Comment’s presentation of 
the proposed framework above, along with the Court’s prior relevant precedents, including City of 
Trenton and Dartmouth College, the point representing Hunter probably falls well within the “zone 
of federalism.” Thus, this signals to us that it was probably quite easy for the Court to conclude that 
the state was permitted to do what it had done. 
 77. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
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compromised in this instance, particularly given that no evidence showed 
that the government entity at issue had been purposefully designed to 
deprive individuals of certain rights. Therefore, although the case was 
likely a closer one than Hunter,78 ultimately the Ball Court determined 
that the relative balance between federalism and supremacy tilted in 
favor of federalism. Consequently, the Court chose not to restrict the 
state’s autonomy in structuring the Power District. 
In light of the foregoing, the apparent disparity between Ball and 
Hunter is consistent with this Comment’s primary thesis that the 
constitutional status of local governments is derivative, not nonexistent 
or independent. In other words, the reason the local government at issue 
in Hunter was disregarded was that the state wanted it to be disregarded. 
After all, Pennsylvania had passed a statute permitting the joining of two 
contiguous cities based upon a popular vote of the two cities’ collective 
population. Accordingly, allowing the destruction of the city was 
consistent with the state’s wishes. On the other hand, in Ball, the state 
had chosen to permit the creation of local special improvement districts. 
In that case, respecting the existence of this local government was also 
consistent with the state’s wishes, because the district had been created in 
accordance with state law. Therefore, in the absence of any constitutional 
restriction, the relevant local government entities simply assumed 
derivative roles under the Court’s jurisprudence that allowed the Court to 
respect the states’ intents regarding their local governments.79 
 
 78. Once again, if we imagine that we plot the unique facts of Ball on our hypothetical, three-
dimensional graph, the results are more equivocal. This is because the Court had already imposed 
the same restriction on other local governments previously, and the right at issue was an important 
one. Furthermore, although the Court had not imposed such a restriction in Salyer, that case involved 
an entity that exercised powers that were far less significant in scope. Thus, the point on our graph 
representing the unique facts of Ball likely fell near the border between the “zone of federalism” and 
the “area of supremacy.” 
 79. See also City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (sustaining New Jersey’s 
attempt to collect a license fee for water that the City of Trenton was diverting from the Delaware 
river); City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919) (upholding a state law 
giving a state commission the power to regulate public utilities even though the law conflicted with a 
city’s prior franchise agreement with the state giving the city exclusive authority to regulate the 
utilities because this was “no question under the contract clause of the Constitution of the United 
States . . . but only a question of local law” and the state was free to change the agreement at will); 
New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891) (upholding Louisiana’s 
imposition of a tax on a New Orleans city water company in the face of a claim that the tax impaired 
a contract between Louisiana and New Orleans giving the city the ability to freely use certain water 
because there was no such contract and the state was free to engage in such regulation); East 
Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. 511 (1850) (holding that because the city of East Hartford 
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 b. Outcome number two: Prong 1 presumption rebutted, but Prong 2 
presumption not rebutted. Milliken is an example of the second possible 
outcome under our proposed framework—where the Prong 1 
presumption is overcome, but the Prong 2 presumption is not. This 
Section’s discussion of Milliken is significant because it allows for the 
appropriate reconciliation of the paradigm example of inconsistency used 
throughout this Comment—the inconsistency between Milliken and 
Hunter. 
As previously noted, Milliken involved a claim that the Detroit 
metropolitan area school districts had engaged in impermissible racial 
discrimination. The plaintiffs sought a remedy that would span the entire 
metro area. Nevertheless, the Court, while finding a violation within a 
single district, refused to extend the busing remedy sought beyond those 
district lines even though doing so would make the remedy more 
effective, noting that there was no evidence that the state itself had 
engaged in purposeful discrimination in the drawing of district lines. 
Applying our framework to the school district at issue in Milliken is 
instructive, because it suggests why the Court chose to impose a remedy 
but limited it to a single school district. Under Prong 1 of the inquiry, it 
is important to note that the right at issue—the right to attend a unitary 
school district—was one that the Court had judicially enforced in the 
past,80 sometimes by mandating busing. Thus, the Court had previously 
 
was nothing more than a subdivision of Connecticut, the city could not bring a claim against the 
State challenging as a violation of the Contracts Clause the State’s choice to forbid the city from 
continuing to operate a ferry after a bridge had been opened). 
A number of cases in which individuals have asserted that they have the right to vote in local 
government elections have also led the Court to respect state decisions about how to structure their 
municipalities. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978); Dusch v. Davis, 
387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967). 
Some of the Court’s zoning decisions also fit within this category. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (sustaining a local zoning restriction of a “village on Long Island’s north 
shore” with “about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people” that limited the number of unrelated 
individuals who could live together in a single household). 
 80. The Court in Milliken clearly recognized this, noting that 
[t]he target of the Brown holding was clear and forthright: the elimination of 
state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain 
schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils. This duality and racial 
segregation were held to violate the Constitution in the cases subsequent to 
1954, including particularly Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 
(1968); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Wright v. 
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imposed restrictions on other local government entities, including other 
entities of the exact same type (school districts) to protect the right to 
attend unitary districts. Furthermore, the right at issue was an individual 
right protected under one of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
Additionally, although school districts are not general purpose 
governments, they exercise significant powers within their relatively 
constrained sphere of influence (education). Furthermore, their 
significant efforts are thought to be public serving and to have broad 
societal ramifications. Taken together, these and other relevant 
considerations likely led the Court to conclude that it needed to impose 
some remedy. In other words, the Prong 1 presumption was overcome. 
Nevertheless, the Court still had to decide the scope of its remedy. 
After all, the Court’s concern for federalism does not dissipate simply 
because it finds a constitutional violation. Rather, this concern continues 
to inform the Court’s Prong 2 analysis, counseling the Court to limit its 
remedy as much as possible—as long as the state has not acted 
purposefully to deprive individuals of their constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. In Milliken, the Court clearly noted that there had been no such 
purposeful behavior on the part of Michigan.81 Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the Prong 2 presumption had not been overcome, and the 
Court limited its remedy to only a single school district, instead of 
imposing a broader remedy that might have been more effective. Thus, 
through refusing to impose a metropolitan-area-wide remedy, the Court 
protected federalism82 by respecting—to the extent possible—the way in 
 
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. 
Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974). 
 81. In fact, in framing the issue before it, the Court noted that the issue was “whether a 
federal court may impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation 
problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary 
school systems within their districts, absent any claim or finding that the boundary lines of any 
affected school district were established with the purpose of fostering racial segregation in public 
schools . . . .” Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
 82. Justice White’s dissent made explicit the notion that the Court had chosen to impose a 
remedy that Justice White deemed ineffective out of solicitude for the state. See id. at 763 (White, J., 
dissenting) (“Regretfully, and for several reasons, I can join neither the Court’s judgment nor its 
opinion. The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences 
will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual 
criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the 
Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of 
Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself 
from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public 
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which the state had chosen to draw its school district boundaries. 
This discussion of how the dual-faceted federalism framework 
applies to Milliken also permits resolution of the apparent conflict 
between Milliken and Hunter—the paradigm example of apparent 
inconsistency utilized throughout this Comment. As mentioned, the bare 
recognition of federalism’s role in both cases was insufficient to explain 
this inconsistency because it did not explain why the Hunter court 
imposed no remedy, whereas the Milliken Court imposed one. This core 
distinction between the cases, however, is fully and easily explained by 
noting that Hunter is a case that fell under Prong 1 of the proposed 
framework, whereas Milliken instead fell under Prong 2. Thus, while 
federalism played a role in each case, it played a slightly different role in 
each one. In Hunter, the Court’s determination that there had been no 
constitutional violation, along with the fact that state law suggested that 
it wanted Allegheny to have no constitutional status, led the Court to 
completely respect the state’s decision regarding its local government 
subdivision. Conversely, in Milliken, the Court concluded that some 
remedy needed to be imposed to protect important constitutional rights, 
but still gave the maximum deference possible to the state’s decisions by 
choosing to limit its remedy to only a single school district. While this 
second, Milliken-type situation might create the illusion that the Court is 
recognizing the “independent” status and importance of local 
governments, this status is in fact only derivative. The Court chose to 
give maximum possible force to the state’s structuring decisions by 
“recognizing” the local government at issue.83 
 
schools in its local school districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case in most 
States.”). 
 83. Other relevant decisions fitting into this category include many of the cases in which the 
Court has imposed one-person, one-vote restrictions. These cases do not provide the same dramatic 
illustration that Milliken does of the role that federalism plays in the Court’s decisions about 
tailoring its remedies once it decides to impose them, since the scope of the necessary remedy in 
one-person, one-vote cases always relates only to the particular local government before the Court. 
Nevertheless, in all these cases it is nonetheless true that the one-person, one-vote remedy is only 
applied to the particular local government entity before the Court. Thus, the Court implicitly accepts 
both the fact that these local governments exist and the notion that such governments are a 
permissible means by which to apportion state governmental power, despite the fact that, if a 
comparison was made between different cities or different counties, one person’s vote in a small 
county election might be worth much more than one person’s vote in a county with a substantially 
larger population. Thus, these cases imposing one-person, one-vote show solicitude for state 
decisions more implicitly, by never questioning the use of counties and cities to divide up political 
power in the states. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (imposing one-
person, one-vote requirements in a municipal bond election); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 
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 c. Outcome number three: Prong 1 and Prong 2 presumptions 
rebutted. The third possible outcome under this Comment’s framework 
exists where both the Prong 1 and Prong 2 presumptions are overcome. 
The most instructive example of this outcome is Gomillion v. Lightfoot.84 
In Gomillion, the Court heard a challenge to the constitutional validity of 
an Alabama state law that redrew the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee. 
The petitioners were a group of black individuals whose residences 
had—prior to this redistricting—been within the boundaries of 
Tuskegee.85 Following the redistricting, they were no longer residents of 
the city, and they alleged that this redistricting had violated their 
constitutionally guaranteed rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, including the right to vote.86 In the district court, the 
respondents had alleged that the court had “no control over, no 
supervision over, and no power to change any boundaries of municipal 
corporations fixed by a duly convened and elected legislative body, 
acting for the people in the State of Alabama.”87 The district court had 
 
50 (1970) (imposing a one-person, one-vote requirement on an election for a junior college district 
board of trustees because the board “perform[ed] important governmental functions” and its “powers 
[were] general enough and ha[d] sufficient impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion” 
that one-person, one-vote should apply); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 
(1969) (imposing one-person, one-vote restrictions in the election of a school district board); Avery 
v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (imposing one-person, one-vote requirements on a single 
Texas county). 
Some of the Court’s zoning decisions also fit within this category. See Schad v. Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (imposing the requirement that any community with any area 
zoned for commercial use must include an area for adult businesses); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down a zoning ordinance that restricted the ability of certain extended 
family members to live with one another). Although, just like the one-person, one-vote decisions, 
these zoning decisions do not dramatically illustrate the role that federalism plays as the Court 
determines the scope of the remedy it will impose, I believe that it is nonetheless implicit within 
these decisions. This is because in both cases the Court implicitly accepts the permissibility of 
having local governments exercising zoning authority. This authority is never questioned despite the 
fact that the Court concluded, in both cases, that the local governments abused their authority. 
Although it could, at least hypothetically, be argued that local governments are too irresponsible to 
be given such authority, such an argument would seem completely antithetical to federalism and to 
the principle that states should be able to structure their internal affairs at will. The fact that these 
arguments are not made, however, suggests that the Court implicitly recognizes the derivative status 
of local governments, imposing restrictions on these local governments because the states have 
chosen to delegate substantial power to them. 
 84. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 85. Id. at 340. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 340–41 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1958)). 
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agreed, granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss.88 Although the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, the Court, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice 
Frankfurter, reversed, holding that if their allegations were true, the 
petitioners’ Fifteenth Amendment rights had been violated by this 
legislative redistricting.89  
The Court explained that the case raised “serious questions . . . 
concerning the power of a State over its municipalities in relation to the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”90 The Court noted that the 
redistricting that had taken place had changed the shape of the city from 
a “square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,” and that this 
redistricting had “remove[d] from the city all save four or five of its 400 
Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident,” 
thereby “depriv[ing] the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the 
benefits of residence in Tuskegee.”91 The Court reasoned that “the 
legislation [was] solely concerned with segregating white and colored 
voters,” and noted that there was no “countervailing municipal function 
which [the Act was] designed to serve.”92 
While the Gomillion Court noted that the respondents had cited to 
Hunter for the proposition that a state had “unrestricted power—
unlimited, that is, by the United States Constitution—to establish, 
destroy, or reorganize by contraction or expansion its political 
subdivisions” and the Court “freely recognize[d] the breadth and 
importance of this aspect of the State’s political power,” the Court 
nonetheless rejected this assertion, noting that “[t]o exalt this power into 
an absolute is to misconceive the reach and rule of this Court’s decisions 
in the leading case of Hunter” and other similar cases.93 Likely 
 
 88. Id. at 340. 
 89. Id. at 346. 
 90. Id. at 341. 
 91. Id. at 340–41. 
 92. Id. at 341–42. 
 93. Id. at 342. In an attempt to distinguish these cases and their “seemingly unconfined 
dicta,” the Court explained that these earlier cases simply stood for the proposition that “the State’s 
authority [was] unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in those 
cases,” not that “the State has plenary power to manipulate in every conceivable way, for every 
conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations.” Id. at 344. While it would certainly 
be convenient if Frankfurter’s assertion that the particular constitutional provision at issue in a given 
case is determinative of whether the Court will choose to impose a restriction on a state’s free ability 
to structure its municipalities in the manner it sees fit were true, later cases, particularly later one-
person one-vote cases, suggest that this assertion does not provide a plenary explanation, see supra 
note 20. On the other hand, the framework presented by this Comment does provide a cohesive 
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recognizing that, given the strong language of Hunter and similar 
opinions, it would be somewhat difficult to distinguish these cases, 
Frankfurter further attempted to buttress the Court’s opinion. First, he 
noted that other cases had “refused to allow a State to abolish a 
municipality . . . without preserving to the creditors of the old city some 
effective recourse for the collection of debts owed them.”94 These cases, 
the Court reasoned, “conclusively show[ed] that the Court ha[d] never 
acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with 
municipal corporations regardless of consequences,” since state control 
of municipal corporations fell “within the scope of relevant limitations 
imposed by the United States Constitution.”95 Second, Frankfurter 
attempted to persuasively distinguish Colegrove v. Green, an opinion he 
had previously written for the Court that had involved the same right at 
issue in Gomillion—voting—but had reached the opposite result, holding 
that legislative districting was a political question unreviewable by the 
Court.96 Frankfurter argued that Colegrove was different, because it had 
involved legislative inaction, as opposed to “affirmative legislative 
action,” noting that “[w]hen a legislature . . . singles out a readily 
isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, 
it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”97 He stated that here “the Alabama 
Legislature has not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with 
incidental inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more accurate to say that 
it has deprived the petitioners of the municipal franchise and consequent 
rights and to that end it has incidentally changed the city’s boundaries.”98 
Applying this Comment’s proposed framework to Gomillion 
demonstrates why the Court reached this conclusion. Under the Prong 1 
presumption, the Court might have considered that the local government 
at issue was a general municipal government that exercised broad, 
significant, and important powers. Furthermore, the right at issue—
framed by the Court as the right to vote under the Fifteenth 
Amendment99—was a significant, individual right guaranteed by the 
Reconstruction Amendments. Additionally, and perhaps of greater 
 
explanation for these cases. 
 94. Id. at 344. 
 95. Id. at 344–45. 
 96. Id. at 346. 
 97. Id. at 346. 
 98. Id. at 347. 
 99. Id. at 345. 
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significance, the evidence strongly suggested that the state had attempted 
to purposefully deprive individuals of this right; after all, the boundaries 
of the city had been changed by legislative fiat from a “square to an 
uncouth, twenty-eight sided figure.”100 This purposeful discrimination 
signaled that state political channels would not likely provide effective 
recourse for vindication of those individual rights. In other words, the 
state had used its powers to directly infringe upon important, 
constitutionally guaranteed rights in a situation involving a general-
purpose government that exercised significant power and influence. 
Thus, it was probably easy for the Court to conclude that the Prong 1 
presumption was overcome and that the Court needed to impose some 
remedy. Furthermore, while the Court’s Prong 2 analysis generally 
would caution the Court to limit its remedy as much as possible, the 
Gomillion evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the state had acted 
purposefully to deprive certain individuals of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights.101 In light of this, the Prong 2 presumption was also overcome. 
Thus, the Court was free to completely disregard the state’s decision 
about how to structure Tuskegee. Consequently, the Court effectively 
redrew the city boundary lines that the state had drawn on the map.102 
 
 100. Id. at 340. 
 101. Id. at 346. 
 102. Another case that seems to fit within this category is Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). Romer involved a challenge to a Colorado constitutional amendment that banned any 
governmental action designed to protect homosexuals. Id. at 623–24. This amendment was passed by 
referendum in response to antidiscrimination ordinances protecting homosexuals that had been 
passed in various Colorado municipalities. Id. at 624. The Court, in a somewhat confusing opinion 
by Justice Kennedy, held that the constitutional amendment violated the equal protection clause. Id. 
at 635–36. Although the state argued, in defense of the amendment, that it did not discriminate 
against homosexuals, because it did no more than put them in the same position as all others, the 
Court rejected this conclusion, noting that this put “[h]omosexuals, by state decree . . . in a solitary 
class with respect to transactions and relations . . . withdraw[ing] from homosexuals, but no others, 
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of 
these laws and policies.” Id. at 627. It noted that this amendment imposed a “special disability” on 
homosexuals since they were “forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without 
constraint.” Id. at 631. Kennedy asserted that the protections that homosexuals could not seek 
because of Colorado’s amendment involved “protections taken for granted by most people either 
because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an 
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free 
society.” Id. Thus, the purposeful discriminatory action at issue in Romer seemed to lead the Court 
to conclude that it needed to disregard the particular state local government structuring decision at 
issue. Interestingly, doing so ultimately led the Court to augment the power of the local government. 
Notably, however, the Court did not suggest that it would have been impermissible for the state to 
have completely removed power to pass antidiscrimination legislation from its local governments in 
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What does the Court’s choice to redraw the lines at issue in 
Gomillion suggest? On the one hand, it might suggest that the Court 
viewed the municipality as having some independent importance in the 
constitutional hierarchy, thereby justifying the imposition of a remedy. 
However, the error of this view is easily revealed by imagining what the 
Court’s decision might have been had the state, instead of merely 
modifying government lines along impermissible but nondiscriminatory 
grounds, had purposefully incorporated a city along racially 
discriminatory lines. In such a situation, the Court would have chosen to 
override the state’s decision, just like the Court chose to override the 
state’s decision in Milliken.103 However, the result would not have been 
respect for a local government. Rather, the result would have been a local 
government’s destruction. In other words, a local government is only 
respected where the choices leading to the creation of that local 
government were legitimate, thus suggesting that that the status of local 
governments is merely derivative. Consequently, decisions about the 
creation and modification of such entities rise and fall on the 
constitutional legitimacy of the underlying state decisions, not on the 
 
a nondiscriminatory fashion, thus suggesting solicitude for state decisions. 
Similarly, yet another relevant case of this type is Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
458 U.S. 457 (1982), which involved a challenge to a state statute that prohibited local school boards 
from busing students in order to promote desegregation. Id. at 461–63. Instead of sustaining this 
restriction on local government power as permissible, the Court held that the statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 476–77. The Court reasoned that the shifting of authority to 
determine when and whether busing was permitted from the local to the state government had 
“worked a major reordering of the State’s educational decisionmaking process,” id. at 479, and that 
this decision had been made on the impermissible basis of race, id. at 485–87. Given that, in general, 
the local school board retained most authority for making educational decisions, this limited cutting 
away of local authority on impermissible grounds was held to be invalid. Id. at 479–80. 
Critically, in both Romer and Seattle School District, because the states’ impermissible 
decisions only dealt with the states’ decisions to take away a particular power from their local 
government entities, the Court’s conclusions that the states’ actions were impermissible did not lead 
the Court to conclude that it had to disregard the local governments at issue. This is so, because the 
states’ impermissible decisions in these cases were not their decisions to create the municipalities or 
to redraw their boundaries. These decisions had been permissible. Rather, the Court merely had to 
reverse the states’ purposeful decisions to restrict the powers of their local governments in a 
discriminatory fashion. Thus, in both cases, the Court, functionally, ultimately augmented the power 
of the local governments at issue. 
 103. This is apparently what happened in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School 
District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), where the Court held that it was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause for the State of New York to create a special school district to serve 
handicapped children of the “Satmar Hasidim,” a group comprised of “practitioners of a strict form 
of Judaism.” Id. at 690. 
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underlying importance of the local governments. Thus, even this 
relatively rare third category of cases suggests that the status of local 
governments is merely derivative. 
Having explored each of the different possibilities under this 
Comment’s proposed framework, I close with a brief section 
summarizing this Comment’s implications. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
As noted at the outset, this Comment’s proposed framework has four 
principal implications. 
First, the framework helps identify some of the factors that the Court 
uses in determining whether constitutional restrictions should apply to 
particular state decisions about how to structure their local governments. 
These factors should lead to somewhat improved predictability of the 
outcome of future cases in this area, although the minutia of my 
framework are almost certainly both imperfect and nonexhaustive. 
Second, and more importantly, my proposed dual-faceted framework 
helps identify the constitutional status of local governments by 
illustrating the nuanced, dual-faceted role that federalism plays in this 
area of jurisprudence. Recognizing federalism’s dual role demonstrates 
that it is most appropriate to conceive of local governments as enjoying 
merely derivative constitutional status, as opposed to independent or 
nonexistent status. This further suggests that the emerging localism 
scholars are incorrect in their assertions that the Court has an emerging 
awareness of the importance of local governments. 
Third, because the apparent consistency and transparency of the 
Court’s past jurisprudence is enhanced by explicit recognition of the 
multifaceted role federalism plays, the Court should make more explicit 
the role federalism plays in its jurisprudence. This explicit recognition 
would clarify that local governments enjoy only derivative status. 
Finally, this Comment contributes to the relevant literature by adding 
greater descriptive clarity to what the Court actually is doing. This 
improved descriptive clarity paves the way for future work that could 
more thoroughly examine whether this derivative status is normatively 
desirable, or whether it would be superior to adopt some alternative 
regime that afforded certain independent status to such local 
governments. 
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